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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME V JANUARY, 1930 NUMBER 1.
THE LEGAL EFFICACY OF ATTEMPTED METHODS OF
AVOIDING PROBATE
Various means have been employed from time to time to avoid
the necessity of the probating of estates. Generally speaking, such
means have utterly failed to accomplish their purpose.
In considering the reasons for such failures it must be borne
in mind that there are two classes whose rights are affected. first,
the parties themselves, and, secondly, creditors and the state by
reason of its right to inheritance tax.
We are not concerned, to any appreciable extent, with the rights
of the state to inheritance tax for the reason that in the absence of
the administration of any estate, our legislature has provided quick
and summary means for determining the liability of an estate for
inheritance tax and the adjustment thereof. The Washington
statutes' provide: that where no application for administration
has been made, or administration had without the payment and
determination of the inheritance tax, any person interested may
apply to the superior court of the proper county by petition, pro-
cure an order fixing the time for hearing thereon, and upon proper
service have the matter heard, and if it should appear that the
estate is subject to inheritance tax, have the proper appraisement
made and the tax levied and collected as in other cases. In any
case where the inheritance tax will not exceed three hundred
dollars, the supervisor of inheritance tax eseheat division may
compromise such tax and issue satisfaction therefor without probate
proceedings, where the necessary facts are shown by affidavit.
By reason of these statutes we are concerned principally with
the rights as between the parties themselves and the creditors of the
party making the transfer.
Whatever may be the rights of the parties between themselves
11929 Session Laws, ch. 205, sec. 4, p. 532.
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under various attempted methods of avoiding probate, there is,
short of the statute of limitations, no effective way of cutting off
the claims of creditors, and clearing title to realty and even person-
alty therefrom, except by formal probate proceedings, m which
notice to creditors is given. That this is so is illustrated m a case2
m which there was no adinistration,' and the heirs had, subse-
quent to the death of their parent, without such administration,
jointly sold property consisting of a note and mortgage. The court
held, notwithstanding a sworn statement that there were no debts,
that administration was necessary, the court saying-
"Since the fact of no debts can be established only by
the appointment of an admimstrator and notice to creditors
it follows that there was no proof that there were no debts,
and the heirs of the deceased were not authorized to make
an assignment of the note and mortgage at the time they
did." 
4
The court specifically pointed out, relying on an earlier case', that
an affidavit or sworn statement as to the non-existence of creditors
is in no sense a legally acceptable substitute for formal probate and
notice to creditors.
Hence the person interested in avoiding probate, whatever method
he pursues, is faced at the very threshhold of his project with the
obstacle that no such device is effective as against creditors, the
non-existence of whom can only be established by formal probate
proceedings, save as to real property where more than six years
In re Collins Estate, 102 Wash. 697, 173 Pac. 1106 (1918).
While it has been held in cases decided in this state that there is
no necessity of formal administration after a long lapse of time "where the
estate had already become vested in the heirs and devisees, and where all
possible claims against the estate had been paid or were barred by the stat-
ute of limitations," (State ex rel. Speckert v. Superior Court, 48 Wash. 141,
92 Pac. 942, 1907, and cases there cited), it has been held, distinguishing
those cases that "the right to administer upon an estate is a statutory one"
(State ex rel. Mann v. Superior Court, 52 Wash. 149, 100 Pac. 198, 1909).
And in the case cited in footnote 2 the impotency of such an agreement for
informal administration is clearly brought out. In any event, such agree-
ments, just like the community property agreements hereinafter referred
to in the main text, are of no validity against creditors, the non-existence
of whom can be determined only by probate and not by confident belief
or affidavit; and, until formal notice to creditors has been given and ex-
pired, free dealing with property distributed under such informal agree-
ments is necessarily impeded, as shown in the quotation from the case
cited in footnote 2. No purchaser or assignee would care to take such pro-
perty since his title, until the statute of limitations had run on claims,
might be subject to attack by any administrator subsequently appointed.
'See footnote 2.
State ex rel. Mann v. Superior Court, 52 Wash. 149, 100 Pac. 198 (1909)
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have elapsed since the date of death without administration during
the intervening period.
MuTuAL, DxEDs
One of the most frequent means resorted to for the purpose of
avoiding the necessity of probating an estate, particularly where
the estate is small,, consists principally of the home and is com-
munity property, is the execution of what has been aptly termed
"mutual deeds." The term "mutual deeds" comprehends all
deeds executed by husband and wife whereby the one conveys the
real estate to the other with the intention that these deeds shall not
be recorded until the death of one of the spouses, whereupon the
deed to the survivor is to be recorded and the other deed destroyed.
The Supreme Court of Washington has frequently held such
deeds to be utterly void and of no effect whatsoever. The reason
for this lies primarily m the fact that delivery is essential to the
validity of a deed.
"It is essential to the delivery of a deed that there be a
giving by the grantor and a receiving by the grantee with
a mutual intention to pass a present title from the one to
the other. It may be made through the hands of an agent
and it may be accepted through the hands of an agent, but
there must be a mutual intention presently to pass the title.
Tins mutual intention is the cardinal requisite. It is
elementary that a deed cannot perform the functions of a
will, hence it cannot be effectively delivered after the
grantor's death. When, however, the grantor delivers a
deed to a third person in escrow to be held until the
grantor's death and then delivered to the grantee, the
grantor retaining no dominion or control over it, the de-
livery is valid and an immediate estate is fixed in the
grantee at the date of the delivery in escrow, subject to the
grantor's life estate.' '6
In the case of an escrow just referred to, by fiction the law
regards the delivery as relating back to the time of the passing of
the instrument into escrow, and therefore avoids the principle of
law winch precludes a delivery after death. Delivery cannot be
presumed from the finding of the deed among the papers of the
grantor after death when the only evidence discloses that the
grantor made the deed and intended that some time the grantee
should become the owner of the property 7
6 9howalter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 160 Pac. 1042 (1916).
'Atwood v. Atwood, 15 Wash. 285, 46 Pac. 240 (1896).
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In the case of Eves v. Roberts8 our Supreme Court held that
mutual deeds of this character from husband to wife and wife to
husband executed by them and placed m a bureau drawer with the
intention that the survivor should use and record the one in which
he or she was grantee are void for the reason that the one cancels
the other.
So, too, in the case of Bloor v. Bloor9 where such deeds were
left with a justice of the peace "to keep," for the reason that there
could be no mutual intention to presently pass title because it
could not be known whether the husband or wife would die first.
Likewise in that case our Supreme Court held that such deeds could
not be construed together as a contract within the provisions of
section 6894 Rem. Comp. Stat. relating to community property
agreements between husband and wife.
The fact that such deeds are placed in escrow with some third
person does not alter the result since of necessity retention of the
dominion is held, because such an arrangement invariably contem-
plates the return or destruction of the deed of the grantor who sur-
vives.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AGREPMENTS
Another means resorted to and coming into greater use as time
passes is what has been termed community property agreements.
By this is meant an agreement executed pursuant to the provisions
of section 6894 Rem. Comp. Stat. to the effect that a husband and
wife may jointly enter into an agreement concerning the status
or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community prop-
erty then owned by them or afterwards acquired to take effect
upon the death of either, provided, however, that such agreement
shall not derogate from the rights of creditors.
There can be no question regarding the validity of such an
agreement as between the parties. It is sufficient to effectuate its
purpose providing always that community property only may be
so disposed of and that only subject to the rights of creditors. Pre-
sumptively all property acquired by husband and wife during mar
riage is community property Such presumption, however, is not
conclusive but is rebuttable. This immediately raises the question
in the mind of an examiner of titles as to whether the property was
community property or the separate property of the decedent. If
seves v. Roberts, 96 Wash. 99, 164 Pac. 915 (1917).
'Bloor v. Bloor 105 Wash. 110, 177 Pac. 722 (1919)
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the latter, it would, of course, not be affected by such an agree-
ment. In this connection, however, it should be borne in mind .that
the law does not preclude the husband and wife in such an agree-
ment from agreeing that all of their property, whether theretofore
separate or community property, should be deemed and regarded
as community property together with any and all property which
they or either of them may acquire in the future.10
Assuming, therefore, that the property under consideration be
community property, there is no question but that such an agree-
ment effectively passes the title thereto to the survivor, but the
question invariably remains as to whether such an agreement was
in derogation of the rights of creditors. This question is, of course,
determined if a period of six years elapses subsequent to the date of
the death without administration, for the reason that under the
statutes of tls state1 the real property of the decedent is not
liable for his debts unless letters testamentary or of adminstration
be granted within a period of six years subsequent to the death.
During this period of six years the rights of creditors, of course,
may only be conclusively determined through proper probate pro-
ceedings. 2 It is for this reason that community property agree-
ments generally fail to accomplish their purpose. Short of the six-
year period only probate can clear the title for purposes of sale.
At one time agreements of this character were assailed on the
ground of being unconstitutional. That question was definitely
decided and their validity upheld by our Supreme Court many
years ago.3
CORPORATE STOCKS ENDORSED iN BLANK BUT NOT DEwvERED
DumIG Lmn
Another attempted means of avoiding probate recently arose out
of the following state of facts: A husband and wife having several
children and being the owners of valuable properties, caused a hold-
mg corporation to be organized to which they transferred all such
properties, receiving therefore, in corresponding interest, stock of
such holding corporation. Thereupon each endorsed the stock
certificates in blank and placed them in some convenient place
with the intention that, upon the death of either, all of the cer-
tificates might be presented to the corporation, which being a close
" Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 Pac. 409 (1920).
"Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 1368, as amended in 1929 Session Laws, p. 597.
"In re Collins Estate, 102 Wash. 697, 173 Pac. 1016 (1918).
MoKntght v. McDonald, 34 Wash. 98, 74 Pac. 1060 (1904).
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corporation, would probably recognize the transfer and cause new
certificates to be issued to the survivor. In such case we are again
met at the threshhold with the proposition that there has been no
valid delivery Of course, if there be no creditors and the inher-
itance tax be paid after a proper adjudication, the only persons
who could question the transaction would be the children or the
representative of the deceased parent unless the corporation itself
should subsequently become insolvent.
It might be well to refer briefly to the principles involved by
reason of the frequency that attempts of this character relating to
stock in corporations are made.
"A completed legal transfer of stock requires (1) an
assignment and delivery of the certificate to the transferee,
(2) a delivery of the stock to the corporation issuing it,
and a notation upon the books of the corporation of the
transfer, and a delivery to the transferee of a new certifi-
cate of stock in place of the old. The equitable title to
stock may be vested in the transferee upon delivery and
acceptance by him of the certificate of stock with the
intent to transfer it to him and with or without a power to
transfer. Such a transfer we hold good between the par-
ties upon the theory that the delivery of the certificate,
which is the muninment of title, is a symbolical delivery of
the stock. It is well recognized also that there may be a
constructive delivery and acceptance, unaccompanied by
a manual delivery or actual change of custody, resulting
from acts and conduct from dealing with goods when there
has been a change in the relations of the parties to the
goods. '14
"Delivery is essential. It may be either actual by man-
ual tradition of the subject of the gift, or constructive, by
delivery of the means of obtaining possession. Construc-
tive delivery is always sufficient when actual manual
delivery is either impracticable or inconvenient.'15
"A good delivery may aid doubtful words of gift, and
unambiguous acts of delivery may be aided by clear words
of gift, not, however, dispensing with an actual delivery "'
"The proof of a constructive delivery and acceptance
must be clear and unequivocable. Evidence of pay-
ment by the corporation of a dividend to the transferee
and his acceptance of it would tend strongly to prove a
constructive delivery and acceptance of a transfer of stock.
• DeNunzio v. DeNunzo, 90 Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323 (1916).
Thomas' Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389, 18 L. R. A. 170, 37
A. S. R. 848 (1892).
16 Teague v. Abbott, 15 Ind. App. 604, 100 N. E. 27 (1912)
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(The reverse must necessarily follow as a corollary ) How-
ever good as a transfer of stock between the parties the
symbolical or constructive acceptance and receipt may be,
it will not affect the rights of creditors or purchasers
without notice."1 7
Referring again to the facts in the case just cited, it will become
at once apparent that if an appreciable period of time elapses sub-
sequent to the endorsement of the stock and the passing of the
same for future use by the survivor, dividends will probably be
declared in the interval and paid to the holder of record on the
books of the corporation. This would at once furnish proof of a
very strong character to indicate that there never was either an
actual or constructive delivery of the stock although endorsed in
blank.
In this connection it must not be assumed that where there is
an actual delivery, without retention of dominion or control, and
endorsement in blank, the subsequent death of the endorser would
affect the power of transfer. This principle is clearly set forth,
as follows:
"Where the assignment and power of attorney are ex-
ecuted in blank the certificate may be transferred from
hand to hand by delivery, like a note endorsed in blank,
and any holder thereof has authority to fill in his own
name as transferee and his own name or another's as
attorney and cause the transfer to be registered on the
books of the corporation. The right and authority of
the holder of the certificate to fill in the blank assign-
ment and power of attorney is not affected by the death
of the transferer.'"
As an instance of the retention of control, the case of In re
Humphrey's Estate9 is illuminating. In that case it was held that
an attempted gift of stock by delivering the certificate to the donee
on an agreement that all dividends should be payable to the donor
during her life, and in case the donee died before the donor the
gift should cease, the stock meantime to remain on the corporate
books in the name of the donor, is not a gift iter vzvos, but is an
"DeNunmo v. DeNunzzo, supra.
216 Fletcher Corporations, pp. 6310-6311.
9 In re Humphrey's Estate, 191 App. Div. 291, 181 N. Y. Supp. 169 (1920).
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act testamentary in its character and hence void, inasmuch as the
donor clearly had the power to revoke the gift at any time.
JOINT BANX ACCOUNTS-JOINT STOCK OWNERS=P
Under the common law, stock jointly owned by two or more
people on the death of one of the joint owners becomes the stock
of the survivor. Even though a joint owner of stock duly regis-
tered as such is without power to dispose of the interest of the other
joint owner during the life of both, a transfer made by the sur-
vivor before the decease of the joint owner becomes validated upon
his death.2 0
This common law principle, however, has been radically changed
by our statutes
Section 1344 Rem. Comp. Stat.,21 which was enacted in 1886,
relating to the abolition of survivorship between the joint tenants
provides as follows
"If partition be not made between joint tenants, the
parts of those who die first shall not accrue to the sur-
vivors, but descend, or pass by devise, and shall be sub-
ject to debts and other legal charges, or transmissible
to executors or administrators, and be considered, to
every intent and purpose, in the same view as if such de-
ceased joint tenant had been tenants in common. Pro-
vided, that community property shall not be affected
by this section."
Section 3249 Rem. Comp. Stat., which was enacted in 1917,
relating to joint deposits in commercial banks and trust companies,
provides as follows
"When a deposit has been or shall hereafter be made,
in any bank or trust company in the name of two or more
persons, payable to any of such persons, such deposit or
any part thereof, or any interest, or dividend thereon,
may be paid to any of said persons, whether the other be
living or not, and the receipt or acquittance of the person
so paid shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge
of such corporation for any payment so made."
Section 3348 Rem. Comp. Stat.,2 2 relating to joint deposits in
mutual savings banks, which was enacted in 1915, provides as
follows
20 5 Thompson on Corporation (3rd ed.) sec. 4059.
" See note 34 for construction of this section.
As amended by chapter 123 of the Laws of 1929.
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"After any deposit shall be made by any person in the
names of such depositor and another person and in form
to be paid to either or the survivor of them, such deposit
and any additions thereto made by either of such persons
after the making thereof, shall become the property of
such persons as joint tenants, and the same, together with
all dividends thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use
of such persons and may be paid to either during the
lifetime of both or to the survivor after the death of one
of them, and such payment and the receipt or acquittance
of the one to whom such payment is made shall be a valid
and sufficient release and discharge to such savings bank
for all payments made on account of such deposit prior
to the receipt by such savings bank of notice in writing
not to pay such deposit in accordance with the terms there-
of. The malang of the deposit in such form shall, in the
absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evi-
dence, in any action or proceeding to which either such
savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the
intention of both depositors to vest title to such deposit and
the additions thereto in such survivor."
Section 3721 Rem. Comp. Stat., relating to joint deposits in
building and loan associations, which was enacted in 1919, pro-
vides as follows.
"Any association may issue shares to or in the name of
two or more persons whether husband and wife or other-
wise, withdrawable by any one of such persons, and the
receipt of acquittance of any one of such persons shall
be valid and sufficient release and discharge to the asso-
ciation for such withdrawals, regardless of the death or
disability of any other such joint shareholder."
A comparison of the last three sections relating to joint deposits
reveals that in only one, to-wit. that relating to deposits in mutual
savings banks, is provision made by the statute that such deposits
and additions thereto become the property of the depositors as
joint tenants and that the making thereof in such form is con-
clusive evidence of the intention of both depositors to vest title to
such deposits and the additions thereto in the survivor. This section
creates a valid joint tenancy, and the whole account goes to the
survivor.
2S
230onneafly v. San Francisco Savings and Loan Soczety. 70 Cal. App. 180,
232 Pac. 755 (1924), where a statute identical in terms was held to create
survivorship.
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The last quoted section has been construed in a recent case2"
not to create a joint tenancy as between the parties, but merely to
protect the association in making payment to the survivor. Tis
construction accords with that generally given to such statutes else-
where.25 Inasmuch as section 3249 as to joint deposits in commer
cial banks appears to be identical in purpose, and substantially
identical in language with section 3721, it may be safely assumed
on the strength of the recent decision that section 3249 will be
similarly construed merely to protect the bank and to have no
effect on the relation between the depositors.
In the case of Meyers v. Albert 6 our Supreme Court said
"Where an account in a bank (commercial bank) is
opened in the name of two persons, the money being sup-
plied by one but each having the equal right to draw upon
it, the title to the account does not pass from the one sup-
plying the funds to the one to whom the right to draw isjointly extended."
This language is used in connection with facts disclosing a deposit
prior to the enactment of the above section relating to commercial
banks, but such language was quoted with approval and a similar
holding made in a later case of Wolfe v. Hoepke27 wherein the
facts disclose that the deposit was made subsequent to the enact-
ment of said statute.
In each of said cases the Supreme Court expressly held that
there was no gift from the one whose money was so deposited in
the joint account for the reason that there was no delivery, the
one making the deposit retaining present control and dominion over
the property or at least partial control over it, which precluded it
from being regarded as a gift.
The language just quoted from Meyers v. Albert,28 was again
approved in a recent case,29 in which the court held that a savings
and loan association account maintained by a father who caused
the name of his son to be placed on the signature card with the
statement that "when he died, the balance in the account would
Daly v. Pacific Savings and Loan Ass'n, 54 Wash. Dec. 169, 282 Pac.
60 (1929)
-* See note 12 Minn. Law Rev. 285, 286, note L. R. A. 1917C 550.
Meyers v. Albert, 76 Wash. 218, 224, 135 Pac. 1003 (1918).
Wolfe v. Hoepke, 124 Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1049 (1923).
See note 26.
Daly v. Pacific Savings and Loan Assn., 54 Wash. Dec. 169, 282 Pac. 60.
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belong to his son," did not by reason of these facts pass to the son,
but that the money in the account passed to the father's estate.
The court expressly distinguishes a California case3 in which a
written agreement 3 ' was filed with the bank by husband and wife
to the effect that the moneys deposited in the account should, as to
each of them, be "joint as to time, title and possession,"--the
inherent elements of a technical joint tenancy, 2 which the Cali-
forma court held sufficient to vest the whole account in the sur-
vivor. Whether the Washington Supreme Court will recognize
the efficacy of such an agreement turns on the construction it will
place on section 1344, as hereinafter suggested.3
In view of these questions not having been decided by our
Supreme Court and the conflict regarding same existing in other
states, it becomes at once apparent that, except in the ease of
mutual savings banks, it is hazardous to employ joint deposits as a
means of avoiding probate. The opinion may be ventured that
when the question is submitted to our Supreme Court it will prob-
ably hold that section 1344 does not apply to cases where the parties
by express agreement have provided for survivorship, confining the
operation of that section solely to questions of survivorship arising
as an incident by operation of law to joint tenancy ;34 and especially
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915).
IIn this case the agreement was as follows: "Conditions of deposit
account No. 11233: San Francisco, Jul. 26, 1902. We, the undersigned,
each for himself and not one for the other, declare that the sums deposited
to this account are, and those sums hereafter to be deposited shall be,joint as to time, title and possession, and further declare that they are not
and have never been the separate property of either, and said sums are
hereby made payable to either of us; and we hereby agree that the receipt
of either of us shall be a full acquittance and discharge to the Mutual Sav-
ings of San Francisco therefor. Bartholomew Kennedy. Mary E. Ken-
nedy. Witness: W H. Cameron."
The agreement could probably be improved by expressly including
words of survivorship, although the court held that survivorship was im-
plied from the words actually used.
233 Corpus Juris, p. 907" Mabte v. Whittacker 10 Wash. 656, 661, 39 Pac:
172 (1895).
"See main text in connection with footnote 34. If the agreement is
ineffective, the statute could be amended. See Oonneally v. San Francisco
Sav. and Loan Assn., 70 Cal. App. 180, 232 Pac. 765 (1924).
3133 Corpus Juris, p. 901, Equitable Loan & Securities Company v.
Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 44 S. E. 320, 62 L. R. A. 93, 97 Am. St. Rep. 177 (1903)
The Washington act of 1886 abolishing joint tenancy is entitled "An Act
to Abolish the Right of Survivorship in Estates Held in Joint Tenancy."
The act has been cited in several Washington cases, but never upon this
point. In State ex rel. Lincoln v. Superior Uourt, 111 Wash. 615, 191 Pac.
805 (1920), the court, without citing the act said (p. 619) "Not only is a
tenure by joint tenancy against the spirit of our institutions, but it has
been expressly abolished by statute."
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that such will be the conclusion of our Supreme Court where the
joint deposit is one made in a mutual savings bank since that
statute in express terms provides that such deposits shall be con-
clusive evidence of the right of the survivor thereto. On the other
hand, it must be borne in mind that the questions are serious and
still open. This of itself should impel one to refrain from adopting
these means of seeking to avoid the necessity of probate.
BEARER SECURITIES IN JOINT SAFE DEPOSIT Box
Owners of bearer securities, particularly husbands and wives, seek
to avoid probate by depositing such securities in a safe deposit box
to which each has joint access, with the thought that upon the death
of either the survivor may obtain the securities and retain title
and possession thereto as against all the world, save possibly the
liability for inheritance tax. There is no doubt that their inten-
tion cannot be accomplished since the same principles referred
to above relating to delivery apply to such securities so deposited.
It should be added that we have no statute relating to this situation
and consequently the general principles regarding delivery and
retention of dominion and control apply
There are undoubtedly other means which are resorted to for
the purpose of avoiding the probation of estates to which no refer-
ence has been made in this article. It becomes apparent, however,
from the principles of law to which I have referred that in prac-
tically all of the means mentioned, there is the constant danger
of dispute and consequent litigation. This in itself warrants one
in taking the position that, save perhaps in rare and unusual
instances, resort should not be had to such means but, on the con-
trary, succession of property upon death should be accomplished
through the regular channels of descent or devise by will and
judicial administration. HUGO E. OSWALD. 0
* Of the Seattle Bar* formerly judge of the Superior Court of Washing-
ton for Spokane County.
